
Hostages on the Highway: The Economics of Sankin-Kōtai
In 1635, Shōgun Tokugawa Iemitsu institutionalized
sankin-kōtai (alternate attendance), requiring all provincial feudal lords (
daimyō) to reside in the capital city of Edo every other year while leaving their primary wives and heirs behind as permanent political hostages. Moving hundreds of samurai, retainers, and supplies along

Japan's five main highway routes forced regional lords to spend between 50% and 75% of their total domain budgets on logistics, travel accommodations, and maintaining separate mansions in Edo. This forced expenditure successfully prevented armed provincial rebellions by steadily draining domain treasuries while sparking rapid urbanization, commercial trade networks, and post-station infrastructure along the Tōkaidō road.
Why today: This economic drain of maintaining dual residences and constant travel mirrors how U.S. Senate candidates are spending record out-of-state fundraising dollars while managing travel schedules across multiple jurisdictions six days before the midterm elections (
NPR).